This paper analyses the relation between competition and concentration in the banking sector. The empirical answer is given by testing a monopolistic competition model of bank branching behaviour on individual bank data at county level (départements and provinces) in France and Italy. We propose a measure of the degree of competiveness in each local market that is function also of market structure indicators. We then use the econometric model to evaluate the impact of horizontal mergers among incumbent banks on competition and discuss when, depending on the pre-merger structure of the market and geographic distribution of branches, the merger is anti-competitive. The paper has implications for competition policy as it suggests an applied tool to evaluate the potential anti-competitive impact of mergers.
Introduction
The structure of European banking industries has swiftly changed since the Second European Directive, implemented in 1992, gave a strong impulse to liberalisation within and across national borders in a sector characterized by tight regulatory constraints. These constraints varied across countries affecting banks' decisions on prices, quantities (through credit ceilings) and branching networks. While deregulation has certainly reduced barriers to competition for banks, it has also indirectly prompted a wave of mergers and acquisitions within and across national borders: as a result the degree of concentration in market shares has increased in almost all European countries.
Since deregulation was aimed at promoting competition, we ask whether this increase in concentration following mergers and acquisitions has reversed the initial objective. In general there are contrasting results on the impact of mergers on the degree of competitiveness of the banking system 3 : have banks gained in terms of scale and scope efficiency and thus passed on the benefit to consumers by reducing prices of banking products (as for instance in Sapienza, 2002) or has competition fallen as a consequence of increased market power of merged banks?
From the perspective of the structure-conduct-performance approach (Bain, 1956) competition depends directly upon market structure and in particular the greater the degree of concentration in the market structure, the lower the degree of competition, since firms can collude more easily in concentrated industries. However, when explaining the shape of the market structure we should account for the feedback of price competition, as firms tend to exit very competitive industries when they anticipate that they cannot recover their entry costs.
This explains why a tougher price competition may be accompanied by an increase in the degree of concentration, delivering a positive relation between competition and concentration.
When analysing the impact of a merger among incumbent banks it is therefore important to rely on a model where competition steams from considerations about market structure.
In general, how do we measure the degree of competition in a market? What is the relation between concentration and competition in a market? This paper presents a measure of competition for the banking industry originated from a model where market structure is explained together with the degree of competition. We then use this measure to evaluate the impact of mergers on banking competition.
The measure of competition proposed in this paper is derived within an econometric test of a model of monopolistic competition for the banking industry. Based on a theoretical model, where banks compete in retail markets both through interest rates and location of branches, the index of competition summarizes information on the market power of banks for given demand and cost conditions in the local market. In particular the index captures the ability of banks to transfer an increase in their branching network size into larger profits. Using the econometric model, we estimate the competitive effect of a merger exploiting the information about the structure of the local market, as for instance the dispersion of market shares or the number of large rivals in the market. We find that these factors are important in explaining our measure of competition together with measures of concentration. Summarizing our findings, a merger may have a pro-competitive effect, regardless of its effect on concentration, when it reduces the asymmetry between market shares or when it increases the number of large banks competing at the top of the industry.
Our index of competition is parsimonious in terms of information required as it basically uses only data on branching market shares of individual banks in local markets. These are the same requirements to compute an index of concentration, such as for instance the Herfindahl index, widely used in antitrust cases when evaluating the impact of mergers.
The relation between concentration and market structure is even more interesting in the light of the recent financial crisis and public intervention to rescue fragile banks by regulators.
Many researchers question the relation between financial stability and competition in the banking system. 4 More concentrated banking systems seems to have better resisted the recent crisis, as for instance the Canadian banking industry compared to the more fragmented US banking industry. Again this rises the question of how do we measure competition? Is it the Canadian banking system really less competitive 5 than the US banking industry? Furthermore, if regulators were to promote greater fragmentation in the banking industry in order to avoid to rescue the "too big to fail" institutions, what would be the impact on competition?
Relation with the literature. This paper is related to the empirical literature based on models of industrial organization with endogenous market structure (inspired by Sutton, 1991) ; we depart from the Structure-Conduct-Paradigm, where it is theorized an inverse relation between concentration and competition, to investigate empirically the relation following the approach in Bresnahan (1991a Bresnahan ( , 1991b and more recently in Berry and Tamer (2006) . Our results are in line with Cetorelli (1999) according to whom the impact of mergers cannot be fully captured by measuring the change in market structure concentration: when for instance the market structure is too fragmented with a single dominant firm, an horizontal merger between medium players in the market might restore competitive conditions, by generating a rival for the dominant firm in the market. In this case, greater concentration in market shares is accompanied by greater competition, breaking down the inverse relation between concentration and competition.
The paper is also related to two previous papers of ours, Cerasi et al. (2002) where we estimate a similar model on aggregate data for several European countries and Cerasi et al. (2000) where we apply the same test to individual bank data in local markets in Italy between 1989 and 1995. Here we apply the same methodology for a cross-section sample of individual banks for France and Italy with the objective of measuring and comparing local market power of banks at county level ("département" for France and "provincia" for Italy). The novelty in this paper is an experiment to predict the effect of a merger in the industry. We simulate a merger between two banks by summing up their branching networks and estimate the impact on competition. In particular we study the effect of several mergers in France among which that of Crédit Agricole with Crédit Lyonnais and of the two most important mergers in the latest years for Italy, namely Intesa with San Paolo IMI and Unicredito with Capitalia. We find evidence that these mergers affect competition; however their impact is different, 5 Recently the Canadian antitrust authority banned two mergers among four of the five large institutions to preserve some degree of competition in the banking system. The argument being that five large banks were enough to preserve competition in the Canadian banking industry. depending upon the pre-merger structure of local markets, in particular upon the dispersion of market shares and the number of large banks in the market.
In Section 1 we explain how to construct the econometric test from a theoretical model of bank branching behaviour and propose a measure of competition in local markets. The results of the econometric test applied to individual bank data in local markets in France and Italy are presented in Section 2, while in Section 3 we comment the results of the test, based on the econometric model, to evaluate the impact of horizontal mergers on the degree of competition and discuss the relation between our estimated measure of competition and indicators of market structure. Finally Section 4 concludes the paper.
From the theoretical to the econometric model
The first step is to derive an empirical measure of interest rate competition in the banking industry. We do this starting from a reduced-form model of monopolistic competition where banks compete in each local market by setting their interest rates and the size of their branching networks. 6 In this section we explain how to derive the econometric test of the model to be estimated.
The theoretical model
The underlying assumption is that banks behave according to a monopolistic competition model where they compete on interest rates and branching network size given their choice of entry in a specific local market. Each bank enters a local market whenever it expects its profits to be large enough to recover entry costs and it expands the branching network up to the point where marginal benefits equate marginal costs. It is assumed that in each period and market banks adjust instantaneously their branching networks to the optimal size. In Table 1 the details of the functional form of profits, entry and branching costs are given for each bank i operating in market j. (1) Marginal benefit of branching:
Branching costs:
Marginal cost of branching:
Branching size decision:
Entry decision: The main objective of the paper is to measure the degree of competition in a market: we introduce the parameter "cci" which measures the ability of banks to translate an increase in their branching network into larger profits. This parameter captures an inverse measure of competitiveness of a market. Let us explain this point.
Equation (1) describes bank i's profits in market j. Basically disaggregate profits of a specific bank in each local market are approximated by a proportion of total market size -S, in our case total deposits in that market -where the proportionality constant is given by a function of the branching market share of the bank, measured as own branches over total branches in that specific market, j cci ij N k j . Note that the only observable bank specific variable is k ij , that is the number of branches of bank i in local market j. We don't need to use any accounting data in this set up, since both S j and N j , the other variables that enter the profit function, are publicly available market data.
The profits in (1) exhibit some properties. First, profits are increasing in total market size S j as a market of greater size allow all banks in that market to share greater gains. Second, profits are decreasing in total branches N j since as the market becomes more crowded with branches, the gains to be divided between banks become smaller and thus per-capita profits shrink;
third, profits are increasing in own branches k ij although the rate at which profits increase depends upon the parameter cci as shown by equation (2). The more intense is competition among banks on interest rates the smaller bank's profits and therefore the less convenient it is to open new branches, in other words an additional branch has a reduced impact on profits.
Therefore we claim that our parameter cci captures the inverse measure of competition in interest rates in a market, although indirectly, through its effect on elasticity of profits to branching. 7
The optimal branching network size is set by comparing marginal benefits to costs of branching. From equation (3) bank's branching costs are assumed to be linear function of k ij and marginal costs are constant and equal to ε ij , as shown in (4). The profit maximising bank sets its branching network size at k ij * >1 such that the marginal benefit of an additional branch is equal to the marginal cost, according to condition (5a), otherwise it sets its branching at k ij *=1 according to condition (5b).
Dropping the subscripts, for given S and N, k* increases with cci and decreases with marginal branching cost. For a given market size, number of competitors and cost conditions, cci will be lower the fiercer is competition among banks. If competition in the market becomes tougher (lower cci) the bank may end up closing branches (k* will decrease) since the expected gains from a larger branching network shrink.
7 The mathematical definition of the parameter measuring the inverse degree of competition is
and it is the elasticity of profits when opening of a new branch if k/2N becomes negligible.
In Figure 1 we represent one specific example of optimal branching size by drawing marginal costs and marginal benefits for the functions in (2) and (4) and parameters S=6000, N-k=300, ε=75. The dashed line represents the marginal cost MC, while the continuous line is the marginal benefit MB for cci=0.9. The optimal branching size is derived from the intersection between MB and MC, and it is approximately k*=400. If competition becomes tougher, that is when the index measuring the elasticity of profits to branching falls for instance from 0.9 to cci'=0.8, then MB shrinks as indicated by the dotted line and the optimal branching size of each bank becomes k*'=100. Finally, banks enter a market only if the expected profits are greater than entry costs for a given branching size as indicated by condition (6).
The econometric specification
The theoretical model is the starting point for the specification of the econometric model, a slightly modified version of the econometric test in Cerasi et al. (2002) . In the model the first order branching conditions (5a) and (5b) hold strictly and banks adjust immediately their branching networks to the optimal size. When we move to the empirical analysis, however, we must allow for a slower adjustment to equilibrium to emerge from the data. We classify each observation, given by bank i in market j and period t, into either of two groups: in the first, all the banks that have expanded their branching network with more than one single branch, namely those fulfilling the conditions Dk ijt = (k ijt -k ijt-1 ) ¥ 0 and k ijt >1; in the other group all the banks that have shrunk their network and the unitary banks, namely those
Define further:
where it has to be noticed that A ijt ≥MB ijt when bank i is expanding its network in market j while A ijt <MB ijt when bank i is shrinking its network in market j. Definition (7), together with branching conditions (5a) and (5b), leads to the following partition of the sample into two sub-sets:
To get to the full specification of the econometric model, assume that
where mc it is the logarithm of the mean of the marginal cost, constant for bank i at time t, and ν ijt is a purely stochastic component of the marginal cost with a standard normal distribution.
From (8) and given the stochastic assumptions above, bank i operating in market j at time t will belong to group E 1t (expanding) or to group E 2t (shrinking) according to the following probabilities:
The econometric test of the branching model consists in estimating these probabilities, at time t, by maximizing the likelihood: 
Measuring the degree of competition
In this section we put forward a measure of the degree of competition in local markets based on the estimated value of the parameter cci from the econometric specification of the previous section. After briefly describing the data, we present the results for each local market and we use them to rank the different local markets in terms of competitiveness.
The data
In the empirical test we don't need accounting data. As a matter of fact there aren't any disaggregate accounting measures of profits nor of costs for each bank in each local market as required by the model; instead, the theoretical model provides us with a simple proxy of bank disaggregate profits, that is the reduced form in (1) provinces in Italy. We use the definition of banking groups 9 instead of banks; smaller groups and independent banks have been discarded from the sample of banking groups in each local market, while still taken into account when computing the denominator N j that represents the total number of branches in the market, since small groups exert competitive pressure on branches of the main groups in each local market. Each observation in the sample is therefore given by the branching network size of a bank i operating in local market j at time t. Further, to capture the coordination effect when taking decisions across local markets for banks belonging to the same group we define a dummy for each specific banking group.
In France all banks have branches in each of the 95 departments, except C. [Insert Table 2 here] As already mentioned, although our definition of bank's profits in each local market is not directly comparable with banking accounting profits (not available from accounting sources at this level of disaggregation), our measure must be strongly correlated with accounting profits since accounting profits are proportional to market shares on total deposits and these are strongly correlated to branching market shares.
Econometric results
The model is estimated on a cross-section for the year 2006 in Italy and 2007 in France. In the econometric specification the inverse degree of competition cci is affected only by market specific variables, while marginal costs are affected by either market and bank specific variables. The econometric specification includes a series of dummies for each banking group in France and for a relevant sub-set in Italy. The parameter cci is estimated conditional on percapita loans and it differs across provinces due to socio-geographical characteristics: in particular in Italy we distinguish between rural and urban areas, while in France for the proportion of rural surface within departments. We expect an increase in competition when per-capita loans and population density are higher as banks have greater incentive to compete for the marginal client in these circumstances.
[Insert Table 3 here]
All coefficients in Table 3 The goodness of the model in fitting the data is measured by comparing the predicted partitioning of observations between the two subset E 1 (all observations for which the bank has increased its branching network) and E 2 (all observations for which the bank has shrunk its branching network or it has chosen a unitary size) in the previous section with the partitioning on the actual data.
[Insert Table 4 here]
As shown in Table 4 the percentage of observations of banks whose behavior in terms of branching is correctly predicted by the model is 84% for France and 75% for Italy. Table 5 provides evidence that the two industries differ in terms of costs and profitability of branching networks.
[Insert Table 5 here]
For what concerns heterogeneity of banks in terms of net profitability of branching networks for Crédit Agricole and especially La Poste, while marginal benefits are lower, resulting in considerably low per-branch profits. The two groups are characterized by large branching networks with branches distributed all over the country, even in less densely populated areas.
[Insert Table 6 here]
In Italy instead per-branch profits are quite homogeneous across banks, with higher marginal costs for Unicredito Italiano. The range of values for MB/MC across banks is in fact smaller in Italy compared to France.
In Table 11 in the Appendix we report the ranking of the estimated index of competition by local markets. The parameter cci varies across counties. Very low values of the parameter in counties where big cities are located, that is densely populated areas, indicate tougher competition. Low values of cci can be found for instance in Hauts de Seine in France, where cci varies in a range between 0.32 and 0.71. In Italy the overall variability of cci is greater, ranging from 0.64 to 1.23. Notice that the index takes lower values in several northern provinces compared to southern provinces. The result that Italian banks in northern regions face greater competition than banks in southern regions confirms similar empirical evidence (see Cerasi et al., 2000 , Guiso et al., 2006 , and Chizzolini, 2007 , among others).
Measuring the impact of mergers on competition
In the last two decades the structure of both French and Italian banking industries has changed due to M&As between existing banks, within and across borders: what has been the effect of on the degree of competition?
We use the model to attempt to answer empirically to this question. We will conduct few experiments about "virtual" mergers, although many of them really occurred in the period captured in our sample, with the objective of measuring their impact on the degree of competition.
Based on individual bank data in each local market, we conduct the following experiment: we sum the branches of the merging banks for each local market and re-estimate the model assuming that these new entities are replacing the old ones conditional on the pre-merger distribution of branches across local markets. We then look at the change in the competition index relatively to the base model. Although we are simplifying the reality, as we know that following the merger banks tend to re-design their branching networks, still we think that the results we obtain are informative of the real impact of the merger.
The French mergers
The most relevant mergers in France in the recent years have been the merger between Crédit Agricole (CA) with Crédit Lyonnais (CL) occurred in 2004 and Credit Mutuel (CM) with Credit Industriel Commercial (CIC) occurred in 1998. Given that our French dataset includes the number of branches for each merger as separate entities in the banking group even after the year in which the merger occurred, we can evaluate its impact ex-post. 11
The The result of the experiment shows that these two mergers have a large pro-competitive effect for the banking industry. All indicators move in the direction of an increase in toughness of competition.
When further adding to the previous two mergers also the "virtual" merger between Banques Populaires (BP) and Caisses d'Epargne (CE), approved after 2007, the main result on the impact on competition is not affected. 12 The inverse index of competition cci increases slightly compared to the previous two mergers, although the ratio between marginal benefits and costs decreases, indicating a loss in branching profitability. It is not easy to interpret these results without looking at the changes in the local market structure, as it will be done in the last part of this section.
The Italian mergers
We conduct the same type of experiment for the two most relevant mergers occurred in the branching decisions, together with market structure conditions. In particular with the merger between Unicredito and Capitalia there is a loss in efficiency due to the large increase in marginal costs. To recover these larger branching costs banks have to be more profitable, as shown by the increase in MB/MC. In the case of the merger between Intesa and San Paolo instead, the inefficiency is limited and considerations about the change in market structure prevails.
Relation between market structure and competition
In commenting the impact of a merger on competition we based our discussion on two effects: the first is the "efficiency" effect of the merger through the change in marginal costs of branching, the second is the "market power" effect due to the change in the market structure. However, we would like to understand better the relation between our index of competition and the various measures of market structure.
Among the measures of market structure we selected the index of Hirschman-Herfindahl (HHI), the GINI index and the number of large banks. The HHI is the sum of the square of branching market shares and it captures the degree of concentration in the market: given that large banks have greater market shares, the index HHI weights more changes in market shares of large banks. The GINI index is a measure of dispersion of market shares comparing the true market shares to the situation in which all banks have equal market shares: it increases the greater the inequality of market shares. Finally the number of large banks in the market counts the number of banks with a market share greater than the average share in that specific market.
First of all we compute the correlation between our index of competition and various measures of market structure at county level. The results in Table 9 show that the degree of competition is affected by the type of market structure. In both countries the index of concentration HHI affects negatively the degree of competition indicating that higher concentration reduces competitiveness. A greater number of large banks in the market increases the degree of competitiveness, providing support to the argument in Cetorelli (1999) that a market with several large banks may be more competitive than a market where one dominant firm face a large fringe of small firms. The GINI index has instead opposite signs in the two countries: a greater equality in market shares increases competitiveness in France, while the opposite occurs in Italy.
Notice that the HHI may not be the best index to capture the degree of competition as the correlation with our measure of competition is about 50% in France, while only 11% in Italy.
Other measures especially the number of large banks contribute to explain the degree of competition in a market and are closer to our measure of competition. However none of these measures in isolation captures the information contained in the index cci.
To better understand the impact of mergers on the competition index we analyze its change in relation with the measures of market structure: the idea is to understand how the market structure changes, due to the merger, affect competition.
[Insert Table 10 to stress that the informational requirement in terms of data to perform these experiments is the same as that needed in the antitrust analysis of mergers to compute local market concentration indexes such as the HHI.
Conclusion
This paper addresses from an empirical point of view the question of measuring the impact of mergers on competition in the banking sector. The question is relevant both from a positive and a normative perspective. European banking industries are rapidly changing following a wave of mergers and it is important to understand how the degree of competition is affected. 13 The 1800/200 rule implies that a merger in a local market where HHI is greater than 1800 and that causes an increase in HHI by more than 200 points should be rejected.
In the paper we provide an estimated index of competition in retail banking markets, derived from a model where branching decisions are modelled together with the market structure. The result is an estimated parameter that measures the toughness of competition among banks, based on the elasticity of banks' profits with respect to branching network size in any given market: the lower the elasticity the higher the degree of competition. By using this index we rank local markets by degree of competition in Italy and France. We provide evidence that the retail banking industry in France is more competitive compared to Italy.
Further, in this paper we measure the impact of mergers on banking competitiveness. In our experiment on virtual mergers we show results of a merger enhancing competition. The reason is that when a merger creates a bank capable of competing with incumbent banks in all local markets, it might erase some of the local niches of market power and enhance competition.
The findings in this paper are based on a static model of bank behaviour. It is part of our future research agenda to take into account a more dynamic version of the branching competition game. Still we think that this model can provide insightful information about the competitive behaviour of banks in local markets and we suggest an index of competition that can be used as a tool in evaluating antitrust cases. * % correct predictions is derived by summing diagonal cells in Table 4 . 
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